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IMPROVING THE ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR ASSISTANT
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS WHO ARE CONSIDERING THE
DECLINATION OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENT'S
RECOMMENDATION TO PROSECUTE
by E/brick Joseph Cerdan

I. Introduction
Imagine an eastbound interstate highway somewhere in the American Midwest
on a warm summer evening. As a seasoned
federal agent with several years of investigative experience, the local sheriff has contacted
you for assistance with the interview of a male
subject. The local sheriff's deputy pulled over
the young man during a routine traffic stop,
which led to the discovery of multiple pounds
of high quality methamphetamine and several
thousand dollars hidden within the vehicle.
You introduce yourself to the young man,
show him your credentials, and ask him if he
is willing to waive his rights as per Miranda.
He agrees, and you conduct a consensual interview.
After the interview is completed, you
determine that the young man was acting as
a trusted deliveryman for a foreign drug trafficking organization. He admitted to you that
he knew what he was transporting across
the United States and that the money was
his payment for services rendered. Based on
your training and experience, you conclude
that you have probable cause that at least one
federal crime has been committed. Prior to
conducting a warrantless arrest and preparing
a criminal complaint, you call the duty (or oncall) Assistant United States Attorney to confirm that federal prosecution will be accepted
by the local United States Attorney's Office.
The Assistant United States Attorney

listens to your facts, but despite your recommendation, declines the case on the spot. He
states that the weight of methamphetamine
and the amount of money does not reach
his office's required minimum threshold for
prosecution. You then decide to call the local county district attorney's office and refer
the case to them. They accept prosecution
on similar state charges, and the case is successfully prosecuted. However, the defendant
receives a lesser sentence than he would have
received in the federal system.
Unfortunately, instances like this occur across the United States far too often.
They involve different federal law enforcement agencies, United States Attorneys' Offices, and investigations, but the result is the
same: federal prosecutions that would lead to
convictions are needlessly turned down. These
declinations result from an unaddressed need
for ethical guidance for Assistant United
States Attorneys who make the important
decision to decline or accept a case for federal
prosecution. The current ethical guidelines are
inadequate. The guidelines either address only
the ethical standards for accepting a case for
prosecution, or they are silent as to any ethical
standards for appropriate declinations. There
is no black letter rule that federal prosecutors
can look to for guidance in these situations.
II. Overview
As in the above-mentioned vignette,
when a federal law enforcement agent is pre-
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should the case be declined, the agent has several options available. The agent can make the
decision to close the investigation due to the
declination of federal prosecution. This could
result in agency-specific reports, explaining
why the investigation was closed without an
arrest, indictment, conviction, etc. If time and
resources permit, the agent can continue to
work the investigation, gathering more facts
and/or evidence of a

paring to make a warrantless arrest, the agent
must contact the local United States Attorney's Office (USAO) to confirm that federal
prosecution will be accepted. However, agents
can contact the local USAO to present cases
at earlier and more convenient times during
an investigation. Perhaps the need for a search
warrant, a subpoena, or simply some legal
advice may prompt the agent to present a case
earlier than at the critical time of a warrantless

arrest.
How an agent
presents a case depends

on which district he is

contacting. Each USAO
has its own unique procedure on how to accept

or decline a case. For

example, some USAOs

THESE DECLN! O ARE A
S

ETH CAL GU DA

swer phone calls

24

hours a day for a certain

period of time, ranging from one day to one
week. The agents in the area are then given
that phone number and have specific instructions to contact that number to present a case.
Other USAOs allow agents to contact any
AUSA at that USAO and present any case to
them directly. Agents will contact AUSAs tiat
they have worked with in the past successfully, or they may "shop" around for one that
is held in high regard by law enforcement. In
addition, other USAOs only allow agents to
contact a supervisory AUSA and present the
case to them.. Which supervisor is contacted
would depend on the facts and type of the
case (narcotics, white collar crimes, immigration enforcement, etc.).
If the case is accepted, then the agent is
assigned an AUSA to work within the investigation. In the vignette above, the agent would
proceed with the warrantless arrest with the
guidance of the assigned AUSA. However,
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
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have a "duty" Assistant
United States Attorney
(AUSA), who has been
provided with a "duty" or "on-call" cellular
phone. The duty AUSA is required to an-

RESUT

f-

can contact the state or
dlocal prosecutor's office
emptand present the case

to them. However, this
lANT OEMCcON
is contingent on there
being an applicable
state charge which the
local office would be
able to prosecute based
on their office's limited
resources.
Regardless of which option the agent
chooses, the declination of the case by the local USAO has consequences affecting parties
throughout the criminal justice system. The
burden on the state or local prosecutor's offices increases as more cases are added to their
already large caseload. State prosecutors in
large cities throughout the United States often
have hundreds of cases assigned to them,
while federal prosecutors enjoy much lower
caseloads. Those cases are then prosecuted
with lesser state charges when compared to
the potential federal charges. The state charges
usually carry lesser sentences than their federal equivalents. In addition, due to overcrowding in state penal institutions, oftentimes the
defendant will not serve the entire sentence,
or the sentence may be deferred altogether
(comparatively, there is no deferred sentencing
or opportunities for parole for the defendant
in the federal criminal justice system). As the
defendants get their sentences deferred, word
2
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spreads throughout the criminal underworld.
Just like legitimate businesses, these criminal organizations make strategic decisions on
where to set up their networks. The organizations decide which states, or jurisdictions, to
travel through when conducting their business, depending on the aggressiveness of the
federal and/or state prosecutors within that jurisdiction. Instead of deterring crime through
effective prosecutions, less aggressive USAOs
may be encouraging criminal activity through
their case declinations.
Likewise, the case declinations also
affect the federal law enforcement agencies
and their personnel in the district. Agents
may feel resentment towards their USAOs or
that their investigative work is inadequate or
unappreciated. Agencies may survive on successful state prosecutions alone, depending on
whether their statistics differentiate between a
state and federal prosecution. However, federal law enforcement agencies have specific
federal statutory authority, which allows them
to achieve complex and far reaching federal
prosecutions. If the agencies continue to rely
on state prosecutions, each agency and its personnel may not be achieving the most effective
results based on their original federal statutory authority.
Each USAO and its individual personnel are also affected by the case declinations.
When management turns down potential
prosecutions, they are denying career-oriented
attorneys experience on quality cases. Federal
criminal investigations can be complex, involving multiple defendants and charges, ranging
from conspiracy to more sophisticated charges
such as racketeering. Attorneys lose the opportunity to prosecute these complex cases,
hone their litigation skills, and increase their
overall experience. A lower caseload would
also reflect on the USAOs annual performance statistics.

III. Background
A. The United States Attorney's Offices
The U.S. Attorney is considered the
chief federal law enforcement officer within
his or her jurisdiction.' There is one appointed
U.S. Attorney for each of the nation's ninetyfour judicial districts (Guam and the Northern
Mariana Islands are served by a single U.S. Attorney). They are appointed. by the President
of the United States for a term of four years
and may continue to serve until a successor
is appointed. Each appointment is subject to
the confirmation of the United States Senate.'
Once confirmed, each U.S. Attorney is subject
to removal by the President at any time before
the expiration of their term., Interim, or acting, U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the Attorney General of the United States.) The Attorney General is the highest-ranking official and
head of the U.S. Department of Justice, which
is the nation's federal executive department
responsible for the enforcement of federal law
and administration of justice.
The U.S. Attorney position is the equivalent of an Assistant Attorney General in the
U.S. Department of Justice's organizational
hierarchy. This is significant because each U.S.
Attorney reports directly to the Deputy Attorney General's Office, who is the second highest ranking official within the Department.
As such, the position carries great prestige,
authority, and autonomy. Each U.S. Attorney
effectively has carte blanche on how to structure and manage his or her USAO.
Every U.S. Attorney has the ability to
organize his or her USAO in a unique configuration, depending on factors such as th.e
size of the district, the types of cases common
in the district, or the district's history. However, there are certain common features within
1
U.S. Attomeys' Manual 9-2.010 (U.S.A.M.), 2000
WL 1708082 (2009).
2
28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2001).
3
4
5

Id. at 541(b).
Id. at 541(c).
Id at 546(a).
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each USAO. Each U.S. Attorney will likely
B. Sources of Ethical Guidance
have a First Assistant, or Deputy U.S. Attorney,
The earliest codified American ethical
who acts as the second highest ranking official
guidelines for lawyers were developed in Alain that USAO. USAOs will generally have a
bama in the late i8oos. The Alabama State Bar
separate criminal division and civil division,
each managed by a division chief (who in turn Association adopted a code of ethics in 1887
(Alabama Code), written by the 2 8" Governor
may have his or her own deputies).' Some
USAOs may further divide their divisions into of Alabama and U.S. District Court Judge,
Thomas Goode Jones9. Judge Jones based
units that specialize in particular cases, and
the Alabama Code on two earlier sources: the
supervised by unit chiefs. The larger districts
will have divisions divided geographically. For lectures of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief
Justice George Sharswood, which were pubexample, the Southern District of Texas has
lished in 1854 under the title of Professional
its principal office in Houston, Texas, with six
Ethics,
and the fifty resolutions found in David
smaller, divisional offices spread throughout
the District. The day-to-day responsibilities for Hoffman's A Course ofLegalStudy (2d ed. 1836),
one of the first written American law school
handling prosecutions and working with law
texts. The Alabama Code was later adopted
enforcement personnel within the USAO are
handled by the AUSAs. AUSAs are appointed, by eleven states and led to the development of
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Canons
and subject to removal, by the Attorney Genof Professional Ethics, the first set of ethieral.7
cal guidelines for lawyers nationwide by the
A.s the "workhorses" of each USAO,
ABA".
the AUSAs are at times faced with the deciThe Alabama Code consisted of fifty-six
sion whether to proceed with prosecution.
generalized rules that were adopted for the
The ability of any law enforcement agent
guidance of the Alabama State Bar Associa(including prosecutors) to decide whether to
tion's members. Rule 12 of the Alabama Code
investigate and proceed with the prosecution
addressed "the Defense and Prosecution of
of a case is known as prosecutorial discretion.
Criminal Cases" stating,
As stated by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, "the decision to prosecute a suspect in a
an attorney appearing or continuing
criminal matter depends on many factors, inas private counsel in the prosecution
cluding the Attorney General's priorities, U.S.
for a crime of which he believes the
Attorney priorities and resources, laws govaccused innocent, for swears himself.
erning each type of offense, and the strength
The State's attorney is criminal, if he
of evidence in each case."' Among the factors
presses for a conviction, when upon
the evidence he believes the pristhat AUSAs consider when applying prosecuoner innocent. If the evidence is not
torial discretion are the ethical guidelines that
plain enough to justify a nolle pros.,
all American lawyers follow. The guidelines
a public prosecutor should submit
have evolved throughout history to the current
the case, with such comments as are
codes that modern lawyers are tested on prior
pertinent, accompanied by a candid
to their admission to the bar, and practice by
statement of his own doubts."
afterwards.
6
Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman, Defending
Corporationsand Individuals in Government Investigations,
Defending Corp. & Indiv. in Gov. Invest. § 6:3 (2012).
7
28 U.S.C. § 542(a)-(b) (2001).
8
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Home Page, http://www.
bjs.gov.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
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9
Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887
Code ofEthics of the Alabama State BarAssociation, 49 ALA.
L. REv. 471, 481-82 (1998).
10
Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Preface (1969).
11
American Bar Association, Canons ofProfessional
Ethics Centennial, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional responsibility/resources/canonsjprofessional ethics centennial.html.
4
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lier Canons, the Model Code did not carry the
The rule does not specifically address
the acceptance of a case for prosecution. How- force of law.'
ever, it does set the first minimum standard for
Prosecutors in particular were guided
prosecution: if the prosecutor pursues a conand bound by the Model Code's Canon 7: "A
viction when the evidence shows the defendant is innocent, then the prosecutor could be Lawyer Should Represent A Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law." Ethical Concriminally liable.
sideration (EC) 7-13 specifically addressed the
Following the Alabama Code, the next
special duties of a prosecutor. It restated the
milestone in American legal ethics took place
1908 Canon's goal of achieving justice rather
in August of 19o8 in Seattle, Washington. At
than conviction. The special duties exist, as
the annual ABA meeting, the Canons of ProEC 7-13 states, because "the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use
fessional Ethics were adopted for nationwide
restraint in the discretionary exercise of govuse by the legal community. They consisted
of thirty-two individual canons, as well as a
ernmental powers, such as in the selection of
cases to prosecute."'' The EC also stated prinsample lawyer "oath of admission" for states
to consider when crafting their own oaths. Of
ciples of discovery, such as revealing damaging
all the canons, only the fifth canon, titled "The evidence, despite its detrimental effect on the
prosecutor's case. Although vague, EC-7-13
Defense or Prosecution of Those Accused of
addresses case selection by prosecutors and
Crime," specifically addressed prosecutorial
the "restraint" that they should use in their
improve
significantly
it
did
not
Yet,
conduct.
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The EC
upon the Alabama Code's minimum prosecubuilds upon the Alabama Code's minimum
tonal standard. It specified that the primary
duty of a prosecutor was not to achieve a crim- prosecutorial standard by adding the term "restraint," rather than suggesting that the prosinal conviction, but to ensure that justice was
ecutor is "criminal" if the standard is not met.
executed. This served a noteworthy purpose:
to give prosecutors across the nation a broad,
Within Canon 7, Disciplinary Rule (DR)
uniform mission statement, regardless of their
7-1o3 sets a mandatory standard when seeking
employer. This mission statement was vague,
prosecution and providing discovery. DR 7-1o3
however, and did not address case acceptance.
was based on Canon 5 from the 1908 Canons.
Section (a) states that a prosecutor should not
By the middle of the twentieth cenproceed with a prosecution if he knows that
tury, the legal community determined that the
is not sufficient probable cause. Section
there
update.
The
ABA's Canons were in need of an
(b) restates the disclosure of harmful evidence
Canons did not provide sufficient guidance
during discovery as found in EC 7 -3. Just as
on many situations and were not designed
in the 1908 Canons, this only addressed the
af1969,
for disciplinary action. In August
threshold for case acceptance, but was silent
ter months of committee meelings, the ABA
as to when declinations are appropriate.
House of Delegates approved a Model Code
of Professional Conduct (Model Code). The
Shortly after adoption, the Model Code
Model Code consisted of nine Canons, each
began to draw criticism from the legal comcontaining Ethical Considerations, and Discimunity. In fact, even the Model Code's Prefplinary Rules. The Canons and Ethical Considerations were designed to be aspirational,
Phillip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Professional
12
Responsibility in the FederalCourts: Consistency is Cloaked
guiding lawyers in their daily professional
in Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59, 63 (1997).
lives. The Disciplinary Rules were designed
Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13
13
to be mandatory, setting a miiimum standard
(1969).
by which all lawyers could be judged by the
Id.
14
bar and the pLiblic. However, just as the carPhillip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Professional
15
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
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ace admitted that there were at least four areas
that would need revision in the future." When
compared to the ABA Canons, the structure
of the Model Code was complicated. 9 "Some
critics described the three part structure as
irrational and unworkable."" There were criticisms that some of the Ethical Considerations
were in conflict with their matching Disciplinary Rules. 9 Also, the nine Canons and their
Ethical Considerations did not carry any disciplinary ramifications. Rather than enumerate black letter rules, the consistent vagueness
throughout the Model Code merely created
an "ethical mood," subject to interpretation by
the local bars.
In response to the criticism of the Model Code, as well as the negative perception of
lawyers following the "Watergate" scandal, the
ABA created a commission to revise the Model
Code.2 Known as the Kutak Commission, after
the commission chair Robert Kutak, this committee published the first draft of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
in J98o.2 These Model Rules were styled after
the American Law Institute's ALI) Restatements of the Law, which are black letter rules
covering various legal subjects. 3 The Model
Rules provide a body of ethical principles that
a lawyer could look to for guidance in differResponsibility in the FederalCourts: Consistency is Cloaked
in Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59, 62 (1997).
16
John F. Sutton, Jr., The American BarAssociation
Code ofProfessionalResponsibility:An Introduction, 48 TEX.
L. REV. 255, 257 (1970).
17
Fred C. Zacharias, FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73
TEX. L. REV. 335, 339 (1994).
18
John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller The Model Code,
and The Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 303, 344 (1996).
Id.
19
20
John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association
Code ofProfessionalResponsibility:An Introduction, 48 TEX.
L. REV. 255, 257 (1970).
21
Sylvia E. Stevens, Bar Counsel: New (and Evolving)
Developments in the DisciplinaryRules, 62-APR Or. St. B.
Bull. 27 (2002).
22
Cynthia M. Jacob, A PolemicAgainst R. C. 1. 7(c)
(2): The "Appearance ofImpropriety" Rule, 177-June N.J.
LAw. 23 (1996).
23
Gregory C. Sisk, A briefhistory ofprqfessional rules
of ethicsfor lawyers, 16 Ia. Prac., Lawyer and Judicial Ethics
§ 3:1 (2012).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
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ent situations.2 The Kutak Commission eliminated the confusing distinctions between Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules;
each Model Rule, as well as its Comments,
would be the sole starting point for any given
situation. As with the prior ethical guidelines,
the Model Rules were not binding and did not
have the force of law.
Addressing both state and federal
prosecutors, MRPC 3.8 "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor" provided an expanded set
of rules to follow when compared to previous

ethical guidelines. MRPC 3.8 included detailed rules for pre-trial activity, discovery, and
public release of information. As with prior
ethical sources, section (a) set the minimum
standard for proceeding with prosecution: if
not supported by probable cause, prosecution
should not proceed. However, MRPC 3.8 did
not include a minimum standard for declination.
In the years following the adoption of
the Model Rules, several amendments were
proposed. As recently as 2009, when the ABA
created the Commission on Ethics 20/20, lawyers proposed changes to many of the Model
Rules. However, since its adoption, there has
been no adopted amendment to MRPC 3.8.
This could be attributed to the fact the MRPC
3.8 only affects prosecutors, a small portion of
the nation's legal community.

C. Other Sources of Guidance
Outside of the ethical sources discussed, the USAOs have other sources that
they look to for guidance. The US Attorney's
Mfanual is a point of reference for U.S. Attorneys and AU SAs, providing general policies and procedures for the daily operation of

USAOs.2 As such, it is not a legally binding
document and only serves as internal guidance for USAO personnel.21; Section 9-2.020
24
John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller The Model Code,
and The Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 303, 345 (1996).
25
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 1-1.100 (U.S.A.M.), 1997
WL 1943989.
Id.
26
6
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provides AUSAs guidance on declining prosecution. It states that a U.S. Attorney has the
final decision on declining prosecution, unless
there is a statutory limitation that requires the
acceptance of prosecution. In practice, case
declination authority is delegated to AUSAs,
as it is not practical for the U.S. Attorney to be
involved in the daily case intake process.
Several other Sections provide additional guidance on case declination. Section

(ABA Standards). The ABA Standards, first
adopted in 1971, provide reliable guidance
through the discussion of "prevailing norms
of practice" and assist in determining what
is reasonable criminal justice attorney performance.27 The primary source for the ABA
Standards was the Model Rules, but it also
aims to discuss subjects not directly covered
by the Model Rules.28 As with the previous
ethical sources, the ABA Standards have no
force of law, but their process of development

RATHR J HAN!
E BLA LETFR RULES, THE LN~TN
OOE
IRAE_
A
VAG'11F -IN'S
VHROU ,:1`UUT TH
1- MOL_
"ETHICAL MOORW SUBJFCT TO WNERDRETATION BY THE LLCAL BARS
9-2.111

expands on the statutory limitation

mentioned in Section 9-2.020, stating that

prosecutions can be declined in certain situations if it is determined that "the ends of
public justice do not require investigation or
prosecution." Section 9-27.220 provides three
factors, in addition to the probable cause
requirement, for AUSAs to weigh when deciding to decline prosecution. First, prosecution
should be declined if no substantial federal
interest would be served by the prosecution.
Second, prosecution should be declined if the
suspect would be subject to prosecution in
another jurisdiction. Finally, if there are noncriminal alternatives to prosecution, prosecution should be declined. The Comment to
Section 9-27.220 also adds an additional consideration: that there be admissible evidence
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.
These sections effectively raise the minimum
standard of probable cause found in the aforementioned ethical sources. It seems that in
practice, AUSAs require probable cause plus
the three Section 9-27.220 factors to accept
prosecution, unless the "ends of public justice" (from Section 9-2.020) justify declination.
Another source of guidance for USAOs
is the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
Prosecution Function and Defense Function

has successfully yielded standards that fairly
reflect widely shared professional views.29
The ABA Standards have three Standards that address case acceptance. Standard
3-1.2 restates the historical duty of the prosecutor to seek justice with discretion and not
to merely seek convictions. Standard 3-2.9
addresses the prompt disposition of charges
once they are accepted and states that a prosecutor should avoid any delay throughout
the process. Standard 3-3.4 resembles the
US Attorney's Manual by placing the decision to charge "initially and primarily" with
the prosecutor. The Comments for Standard
3-3.4, state that a prosecutor's office should
have a screening process for cases, to prevent
a high acquittal rate. This is comparable to the
US Attorney's Manual's Comment to Section
9-27.220, where the avoidance of acquittal is
an implied principle. In Section 9-2.101, the
US Attorney's Manual recommends that all
AUSAs become familiar with the ABA Standards since the federal courts consider them
Rory K. Little, The ABA'S Project to Revise the
27
Criminal Justice Standardsfor the ProsecutionandDefense
Functions, 62 Hastings L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011).
Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function
28
and Defense Function Introduction, at xii (3 ed. 1993).
Little, Supra note 27.
29
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D. Published Concerns
In 1978, a highly publicized report by
the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO),
the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of
the U.S. Congress, described the high levels of
case declination by the USAOs. o The report
stated that the USAOs declined to prosecute
62% of the criminal complaints available for
prosecution during fiscal years 1970-76.' Of
the

62%,

the report explained that only 37%

were not prosecutable because of legitimate
reasons, such as legal deficiencies.2 There
were no explanations for the other declinations. In response to the report, the U.S. Department of Justice issued the Principles of
Federal Prosecution.3 3 The Principles were intended to promote effective prosecutorial discretion by AUSAs, and led to revisions within
the US Atorney's IManual, such as the incl usion of the three factors in Section 9-27.220. 4

IV. Sociological and Political Forces
Inappropriate case declinations at USAOs across the country are partially a result
of the lack of ethical guidance. However, there
are other outside forces that can affect the
decision to accept federal prosecution. For
each prosecutorial decision, an AUSA weighs
factors such as office resources, case strengths,
and subject's culpability. However, the personalities, motivations, and objectives of the
individual AUSA frame the final decision. As
an organizational entity, each USAO sets its
unique policies on prosecutorial discretion.
The policies are based on internal reporting
requirements, minimum thresholds, and other
organizational strategies. These forces, outside
of the legal ethics framework, affect the US
AOs ability to effectively accept cases.
-

during appropriate cases. As with the Model
Rules, the ABA Standards are silent as to
when case declination is appropriate or not.

The individual AUSA ideally has a
mutual goal with law enforcement agents of
crime control though effective prosecutions.
The manner in which they reach their acceptable level of crime control varies, depending
on their personal interests, such as an interIn 2010, the GAO again published a
est in a specific area of federal criminal law.
similar report. However, this report addressed
At one end. of the spectrum, some AUSAs will
the high level of case declinations occurring in. achieve this level by maximizing the amount
Indian Country (a term for the self-governing
of charges applied to the largest number of
Native American communities within the U.S.). defendants." These AUSAs will aggressively
3 The report stated that through fiscal years
accept many cases, some of which could war2005-o9, 5o0 % of cases presented for prosecurant declination, with the result of attaining as
tion were declined.3 6 Of the cases declined,
many convictions as possible. They will assist
72% were declined for appropriate reasons,
their agents with "stacking" additional charges
such as weak evidence or issues with witnessagainst the defendants, encouraging them to
es.3
reach a plea agreement, avoid trial, and reach
a quick resolution, thus freeing the AUSA to
work on the next case. These AUSAs are likely
younger, risk-seeking, and interested in form30
Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Baring a strong reputation with the law enforcegaining Tradeoff 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 99 (2002).
ment community and the local bar. Through
31
U. S. Attorneys Do Not Prosecute Many Suspected
the large number of cases prosecuted, they
Violators Of Federal Laws - GGD-77-86, 7 (1986).
get the opportunity to showcase or improve
32
Id. at 8.
33
Wright, Supra note 27.
their litigation skills3 9 An "agent's AUSA" runs
34
Id.
35
GAO-i 1-167R Declinations of Indian Country Matters, 3 (2010).
36
Id. at 3.
37
Id.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
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38
Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge
Movement and Theories ofProsecutors,91 Marq. L. Rev. 9,

29 (2007).
39
Id. at 31.
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the risk of creating a caseload that becomes
unmanageable, leading to increased stress
among other problems resulting from being
overworked. However, they may continue to
aggressively accept cases until they are promoted, leave to work at a different firm with
solid work experience, or begin to decline
cases more often to bring down their caseloads to manageable levels,
Most AUSAs will focus on specific

At the other end of the spectrum are
the AUSAs who only accept cases that are
likely to be resolved through a plea agreemen[ due to the amount of evidence against
the defendant. These AUSAs only accept cases
that seem to be gnaranteed convictions. They
are extremely risk-averse, and as such, decline
most cases because of the fear of participating
and losing in a trial. They accept cases because
they are winnable or there is no legitimate
excuse to decline. Rather than using the constituitionally required probable cause standard,
they use the higher criminal trial standard
of "beyond a reasonable doubt." These are
AUSAs who are considered "retired on duty"
by their peers. They arc likely near the cud
of their careers, trying to do the required
minimum to stay employed until they retire.
These AUSAs continue to make satisfactory
performance evaluations because they may
be judged on their conviction rates, regardless of the total number of cases prosecuted.
For example, one of these risk-averse AUSAs
may have a 900 conviction rate for one year.
This would seem hihly successful at first
e
ogti
gacbtpoeuInwsol
lys are e decind
ce he p rsTher artl
.

crimes, as they have likely been assigned to
a division by their management. In addition to their assigned case type, they create a
personal set of priorities on which crimes to
pursue prosecution. 4 0 These priorities could
be based on factors such as the seriousness
of the crime or the defendant's criminal history. For example, an AUSA will likely decline
federal prosecution o an illegal alien with no
criminal history under 8 U.S.C. 325 (improper
entry by alien). The AUSA will explain that
an administrative action, such as a deportation from the United States, would be a better
alternative and more effective use of federal
resources. However, that same Al SA would
be more likely to accept prosecution when an
ho iosnessan
Thosef cases that could result in trial may also
as
aent pesennfactorses
be avoided because a high trial rate could be
member with a substantial criminal history,
'or prosecution. In addition to charging
interpreted as a sign of overzealousness or
U.S. C. 6325, the AtUSA would be able to seek
ineffective negotiating skills. 4' Finally, these
ATSAAs may simply increase their leisure time
a ten year sentencing enhancement for being
by resolving more cases though guilty pleas
a documented gang mnember under n8 U.S.C.
how
and
uaving high declination rates. 4 r
street
gangs).
This
illustrates
52i (criminal
some AUSAs will only accept cases that could
Aside from the individual AUSA,
result in their prioritized charges, maximizing
USA
affects its level of case declinaeach
those convictions while declining cases that
ion through its organizational strategies and
involve non-priority, or lesser charges. Perhaps
policies. The US Attor reys Manual requires a
they will be frank with the agent, providing
report when a case is closed without proseonadvice on what investigative steps should be
tIon. This reporting requirement encourages
followed to achieve sufficient probable cause
for the prioritized charges. On the other hand, case declination, as cases are declined before
an AUSA risks opening a USAO case and
the AUSA may simply decline [he case, legitihaving to report case closure. When a case is
mately citing UScO priorities, or that a state
declined before opening a USAO case, there is
charge may be the appropriate action instead,
Id. at 31.
The vast majority of USAs could be classified 41
42
Id.
in the middle of the spectrum.
____________43

40

Id. at 29-30.

U.S. Attorneys' Manual 9-2.020 (U.S.A.M.), 2000

WL 1708083.
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no reporting requirement. Without any report,
there is no statistic or measure to provide to
the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS),
which is responsible for measuring activity
at all stages of the criminal justice system.
Among all the statistical reports provided,
the BJS also provides measures of successful prosecutions for each USAO. However,
the BJS cannot accurately measure the actual
number of case declinations if no report is
filed.

prevent improper or insignificant investigations from going forward.
As part of the case intake process, each
USAO has its own informal or unwritten policies that guide case acceptance. These policies
prioritize which case types are aggressively
enforced and conversely, which case types are
occasionally enforced.4 For example, USAOs
have informal minimum thresholds for drugrelated offenses. Drug-related offenses may
have higher thresholds in the USAO for the
Southern District of Florida, because of the

THE MNTEGRALON,, OF A LAW ENFO'J.,LEN ABENT1 i AN ADVIKRY
CAPACITY AT THE CASE WNAKEI'" POUNLO ADORES Ji CUE OF
MPROPER DFELL IAU
ONS BY AWOAFRESH VIE OW, TO THE OEOIhON
A_,

V. Possible Explanations
As stated by the BJS, the primary reasons USAOs cite for case declinations are
case-related reasons, such as weak evidence
and other legal deficiencies.< The BJS also
recognizes many other legitimate reasons,
including lack of resources, minimal federal
interest, alternative resolutions available, etc. 5
These reasons demonstrate how the USAO
case intake process acts as a screening and
regulatory device, preventing improper prosecutions from going forward while preserving a manageable caseload."6 This screening
process is the same as the screening process
performed by law enforcement agents when
deciding to initiate or continue with an investigation. Agents decide whether to initiate or
proceed with an investigation depending on
the same factors the AUSAs weigh, such as
agency resources and manpower, the strengths
of the case, or agency priorities. Agents, as well
as their management teams, screen cases to
44

See generally Bureau of Justice Statistics Basis for

Declination 2008, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/
fjsst/2008/tables/fjs08st203.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
45
See id.
46

Donald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bar-

gaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 50-51(2002).
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
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higher number of cases referred for prosecution, than in the USAO for District of Idaho.!'
Those cases that do not meet the minimum
threshold could be best handled by a state or
local prosecutor's office instead, freeing the
AUS As to focus on more important investigations. With these unique policies, the same
federal crimes will be prosecuted differently,
depending on which USAO is proceeding
with prosecution, thus showing disparities in
case declination rates.4 9
VI. Comparative Perspective
To better understand case declinations
in the U.S. federal criminal justice system,
one may look to other countries' criminal
justice systems. In the U.S., the criminal justice system is classified as an adversarial one,
where the court acts as an impartial mediator between the prosecution and the defense.
The court rules on issues of law, and leaves
questions of fact for the jury to decide. In
comparison, France's criminal justice system is
classified as an inquisitorial one. In an inquisi47
William T. Pizzi, UnderstandingProsecutorial
Discretionin the United States: The Limits of Comparative, 54
Ohio St. L.J. 1325, 1344 (1993).
48
Id. at 1343.
49
Id. at 1344.
10

torial system, the courts are actively involved
in some portion of an investigation.o An
inquisitorial judge may question witnesses, defendants, or perform other fact-finding tasks,
while the lawyers on each side of a prosecution argue on behalf of the state or defendant.
The French criminal justice system
is organized in the Ministry of Justice (comparable to the U.S. Department of Justice),
which is headed by the Minister of Justice
(the American equivalent would be the Attorney General).' All French prosecutors serve

in the Ministry's bureaucratic hierarchy, and
all are subject to an entrance exam before
being hired by the Ministry." Instead of the
American system that includes state and local prosecutor's offices, the French system is
centralized in a single, unified national system.
As such, the French prosecutor's offices follow
the same uniform policies nationwide, whereas a U.S. Attorney exercises some freedom in
setting individual policies in his USAO. With
a national system, all decisions by French
prosecutors are subject to review or possible
correction by their non-politically appointed
management." Therefore, the French model of
prosecutorial discretion is customarily carried out at the supervisory ranks. Additionally,
French prosecutors are not as convictiondriven as their American counterparts." They
are instructed to determine a just solution to
problems, which does not always necessarily
mean seeking prosecutions.
Geraldine Szott Moohr, ProsecutorialPower in
50
an AdversarialSystem: Lessons From Current White Collar
Cases and the InquisitorialModel, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 165,
194 (2004).
Richard S. Frase, Comparative CriminalJustice as
51
a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do The French Do It,
How Can We Find Out, And Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 539, 560 (1990).
Id.
52
Geraldine Szott Moohr, ProsecutorialPower in
53
an AdversarialSystem: Lessons From Current White Collar
Cases and the InquisitorialModel, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 165,
194 (2004).
Yue Ma, A Comparative View ofJudicial Supervision
54
ofProsecutorialDiscretion,44 No. 1 Crim. Law Bulletin Art.
III (2008).
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French law enforcement agents have
a unique relationship with their prosecutors.
French law enforcement agents are instructed
to notify prosecutors "without delay" upon the
discovery of an offense, and "immediately" if it
is a "flagrant" offense." This early involvement
of prosecutors allows them to act as a check
on the police, sometimes directing how the investigation should proceed, or preventing the
use of questionable investigative methods. 6 In
fact, French prosecutors are known to arrive
at the scene of an offense with the police, or
shortly thereafter7 Despite the early prosecutorial involvement in criminal cases, French
declination rates are comparable to those by
the USAOs."
Not all of the features of the French
inquisitorial system would be applicable in
the American adversarial system. However,
the USAOs throughout the country could
limit improper case declination by following
some of the French features. Law enforcement agents should attempt to increase AUSA
participation in the early stages of investigations, similar to their French counterparts.
Likewise, USAOs should allow and encourage
the increased participation, and. not require
that a USAO case be officially opened to avoid
the reporting requirement. Perhaps creating a
general USAO case, where each AUSA could
document the early exploratory activities in
potential cases, would be suitable for USAO
accountability. Early participation by AUSAs,
without the necessary commitment to accept
the case, could decrease improper case declination.
VII. Recommendations for Change
As discussed, there is a necessity for a
of
ethical guidance for prosecutors when
level
declining law enforcement agent's potential
55
Richard S. Frase, Comparative CriminalJustice as
a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do The FrenchDo It,
How Can We Find Out, And Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 539, 557 (1990).
Id.
56
Id
57
58
Id at 615.
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cases. However, this absence of ethical standards is correctable. There are several recommendations that would address this need
directly and indirectly. Each potential solution
carries with it distinctive strengths and weaknesses to consider when implementing them.
The most direct approach to rectify the
lack of ethical guidance is by adding a new
ethical guideline to the current set. A modification to MRPC 3.8 could include a section
on declining cases. For example, an additional
section could be worded as: "the prosecutor in
a criminal case shall refrain from declining a
charge that the prosecutor knows is supported
by probable cause" (this is a purposely, closelyworded companion to MRPC 3.8 (a)). It is conceivable that this word choice could undermine the practice of prosecutorial discretion,
making prosecutors accept all cases supported
by probable cause. Perhaps adding a supplementary phrase after the aforementioned section would create a more flexible rule, such as
"... unless there is a valid or legitimate reason

for the declination." This would provide some
room for appropriate declinations based on
factors such as office and judicial resources,
while emphasizing that declinations should
be made carefully. The proposed section could
also be modified by replacing the words "refrain from" with "make reasonable efforts to
avoid," thus making the rule more permissive while still addressing declinations in the
MRPC. If an additional section is not feasible,
then at least an additional comment to MRPC
3.8 could explain the same ethical theory.
The ABA has an existing amendment
process for the addition or modification of a
Model Rule. Recently, the 2oo9 ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was created to perform a
thorough three-year review of the Model Rules
and the American system of lawyer regulation. A modified MRPC 3.8 could fit in the
Commission's transparent review and amendment process, leading to a rule that has been
discussed, changed, and adopted by the ABA.
Once adopted, the newly modified MRPC 3.8
would next have to be adopted by each state's
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
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judiciary. This additional review step would
ideally provide an improved rule, better suited
to the needs of each individual state. HWhen
the new MRPC 3.8 is finally adopted by the
states, it would not only provide guidance to
the USAOs, but also to the state and local
prosecutor's offices as well.
A niodified MRPC 3.8 would also be a
cost-effective alternative. The ABA, and each
state, would spend the initial time and effort
in the adoption process. However, if an adoption process were already under way, such as
the present Ethics 20/20 process, then one
additional Model Rule modification would
actually lower the cost expended per Model
Rule modified or adopted. The time expended
in publishing and promoting the new Model
Rule would be relatively small because of the
Internet. The ABA's website, as well as other
free legal academic/research websites, could
publish the new Model Rule quickly. As the
new Model Rule spreads, it wonld have an
immediate impact. It would likely be taught in
ABA accredited law schools throughout the
nation within the semester, as law students
take their legal ethics class and prepare for
their nationwide ethics examination. As the
new Model Rule is taught and accepted, it can
become a new reference point for updating
other instructional sources, such as the US
Attorney'Manual and the ABA Standards.
The adoption of a new MRPC 3.8
would not come without some dilemmas.
MRPC 3.8 only affects prosecutors, a relatively
small portion of the legal profession, so it
would not be a priority for review by the ABA.
Even if the modification was proposed in an
ABA meeting, there would be expected backlash from prosecutors. Federal and state prosecutors have a legitimate argument that the
modified MRPC 3.8 would reduce their ability
to apply prosecutorial discretion effectively.
They would explain that they already have
high caseloads despite limited office resources, particularly in the state prosecutors' offices.
A larger caseload would limit their time spent
per case and could lead to lower conviction
12
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rates. Another foreseeable cost would be the
development and deployment of Contin u
ing Legal Education (CLE). Federal and state
prosecutors would have to spend at least a few
hours away from work to learn about the new
MRPC 3.8. This cost may be picked up by the
local bar association or the prosecutor's office. If these costs make the adoption of a new
MRPC 3.8 impossible to achieve, then perhaps
providing guidance, from a different viewpoint, directly within the USAO could provide
change quickly.
As explained previously, each USAO
has its own distinctive case intake process.
The integration of a law

enforcement agent in an
advisory capacity at the
case intake point could
address the issue of
improper declinations
by adding a fresh viewpoint to the decision.

An experienced law
enforcement agent, who
is not directly related
to the case being re-

ferred or to the agency
presenting the case,

would be able to pro-

Ligate allegations of misconduct within the
Department (Office of Inspector General) and
the USAOs (Office of Professional Responsibility). These agencies have law enforcement
agents that could. participate in, or assist in the
oversight, of the USAO intake process.
The embedded agent could be from
a state or local law enforcement agency. This
would increase communication between their
agency and the USAO, providing the "locals"
with a better understanding of how a USAO
operates and how they can work together.
Case referrals from the state and local agencies would increase, providing them another
alternative for prosecution.

ANOTHER SLUT IIN WOULD BE THE
CREATION OF A ML LTIPERSON RE\ EW
p
AT THE U, A0S CASE NTAKE
BIAR
IT -E O
WOULD CONSIST OF
A
N
OF TH ORIINAL
IN1,AK AUSA P'R SONNL, LAW
ENFORCE NT AL ENTS, AND STA E
RD SECOTORS.

vide valuable insight to
the AUSA making the decision. The wealth of
knowledge and education in the federal agent
ranks should be used in the intake process.
Although not a universal requirement, the vast
majority of federal agents possess an undergraduate degree, coupled with years of investigative experience. There are also many agents
who have Juris Doctors, or were practicing
attorneys before joining the law enforcement
profession (some federal agencies, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have entry programs that recruit directly from American law schools). The agent should be detached, perhaps being from an agency outside
of the U.S. Department of Justice, to avoid any
foreseeable bias. If necessary, the U.S. Department of Justice has two agencies that inves-

With an embedded agent in the case
intake process, the
decision. would ideally
become a collaborative
discussion. The agent
would explain his opinion on whether the
probable cause threshold was reached, wheth.er there are further
investigative steps that
should. be pursued, or
whether the case should
be declined. With the agent's experience, the
actual feasibility or futility of potential investigative steps would be debated, compared to
the AUSA's theoretical suggestions.
Placing an agent at the USAO does
pose some understandable difficulties. The
agent would require office space and equipment. This could be lessened by having the
agent be at the USAO's office on a part-time
basis, or perhaps have him be subject to a
callout as needed. A conference call including
the referring agent, the AUSA, and the intake
agent, could achieve the same benefits while
limiting the office costs.
Another issue with agent placement in
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the USAO would be the increased time spent
during case intake. A. decision that may have
taken a few minutes before the placement
could become more time-consuming. The
discussion, although beneficial, would prolong
the decision, particularly if the case referred
is a difficult one. This would take time away
from the AUSA's other daily duties, whether it
be case work or case intake. A possible resolution could be a predetermined time limit
for case intake to be used in those situations
where the discussion is prolonged. Regardless,
the final decision to accept a case for prosecution rests with the AUSA.. If a discussion takes
too much time, the AUSA can end it by making the decision.
The human factor could also become
a problem with the agent placement. The
federal government has over eighty federal
agencies that have law enforcement personnel.
Since many of the agencies share investigative
authorities, cases will occasionally overlap. For
example, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigates drug crimes as found
in Title 21 of the Unites States Code. However,
the FBI and Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) also have concurrent Title 21 jurisdiction
with DEA. Natural investigative overlaps such
as these have led to tense rivalries between
agencies. If the embedded agent participates
in a case referral from an agency that he does
not care for, there is a risk that he may sabotage the case and improperly advocate for
case declination. The opposite is also true: an
agent could zealously push for prosecution in
one of his agency's cases, despite there being
reasons for declination. Similarly, if an agent
knows that the embedded agent is from a rival
agency, the case may never reach the USAO
and instead be presented to the state or local
prosecutor's office.

agent placement, the board would encourage
discussion and increase transparency. However, because of time constraints, this board may
not be practical for situations where a warrantless arrest is imminent. This board could
act as a review committee for longer-term
investigations that are presented for prosecution. If declination is appropriate, a state or
local prosecutor would be present to assist the
agent with presenting the case to their office.
VIII. Conclusion
After review of various ethical sources,
both past and present, as well as other factors
affecting case declination, it is apparent that
there is a need for ethical guidance for AUSAs
when making the important decision to decline a law enforcement agent's case for prosecution. There is presently a lack of guidance
in the ethical sources, specifically the Model
Rules, which can guide AUSAs when deciding to decline cases.\A proposed amendment
to the Model Rules, providing factors such as
those found in the US Attorney'siianualto
consider when declining a case, would be a
direct and cost effective improvement to the
status quo.

Another solution would be the creation
of a multi-person review board at the USAO's
case intake point. The board would consist of
a combination of the original intake AUSA
personnel, law enforcement agents, and state
or local prosecutors. Much like the single
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
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